Introduction
Schizophrenics and sufferers ofidiopathic Parkinson's disease do not routinely meet in outpatient departments. This is hardly surprising given that these two groups of patients represent typical custom for psychiatrists and neurologists, respectively. Indeed, the diseases appear very different when their basic nature is considered superficially. Parkinsonians are generally elderly and present to the medical establishment with a movement disorder, the neuropathology of which is inexorably progressive and relatively welldefined. In stark contrast, schizophrenics usually present, or are presented, in early adulthood with disorders of mentation or behaviour that can best be described as 'bizarre' and beyond normal experience. Further, schizophrenia is not a unitary disorder and the symptomology often changes in character as the disease progresses in an unpredictable manner. Any neuropathology, certainly in the early stages, is obscure, reflected by its categorization as a 'functional' disorder. Acute schizophrenics have been traditionally thought of as having a fundamental dysfunction of perception, a problem of 'input', whereas parkinsonian patients, it would appear, clearly have problems of 'output'.
On closer inspection, however, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that the diseases are somehow related. From a pharmacological perspective, considerations of causation and treatment imply that they lie at opposite ends of a spectrum of dopaminergic activity. Furthermore, even untreated schizophrenics do have well-documented disorders of movement. These include dyskinesias in the form of writhing mannerisms and choreiform, sprawling movements described by both early and contemporary commentators. More strikingly, a current line of reasoning, much in vogue, highlights the remarkable concordance between the nature of subtle specificcognitive impairments seen in Parkinson's disease and those more obviously seen in chronic schizophrenia. The suggestion that these patterns of deficit both reflect dysfunction of prefrontal cortex and its output will be reviewed in the context of recent neurobiological and psychological theories offronto-striatal interactions. In particular, the notion will be addressed that both disorders are best understood in terms of a breakdown in the control of action. Firstly, current theories concerning the function of prefrontal cortex will be reviewed briefly.
Functions of the prefrontal cortex
The prefrontal cortex is an enigmatic area of the frontal lobes, difficult to define anatomically and functionally. It roughly corresponds to frontal cortex receiving a dual afferation from dorsomedial thalamus and dopamine-containing nuclei in the ventral mesencephalon, thereby excluding areas of motor cortex. It is the last area of the brain to develop phylogenetically and mature ontogenetically. At the risk of sounding metaphysical, its 'higher' functions subsume the nature of consciousness itself, allowing introspection, creativity, initiative, flexibility and personal feeling. Broadly speaking, prefrontal cortex is essential for abstract thought, synthetic reasoning, and the planning of independent behaviours in time and space toward future goals. Despite its almost revered position at the summit of the neuraxial hierarchy, bilateral ablation of prefrontal cortex for intractable epilepsy does not grossly impair patients on IQ testing, an observation surprisingly noted by Hebb' in the 1930s.
However, at least two patterns of deficits have emerged from consideration of vast numbers of patients with frontal damage, traumatic or otherwise. Changes in social behaviour, affect, initiative, and spontaneity are associated with damage to the orbitofrontal region. Dorsolateral lesions, on the other hand, are characterized by a gamut of behavioural abnormalities in situations demanding certain aspects of 'cognitive' control. Suitable examples of deficits include a poor memory for the temporal sequence of events, defective spatial orientation, and impaired executive control of certain classes of movement, especially involving the eyes.
The dichotomous nature of frontal deficits also seems to apply if personality changes are emphasized. Blumer and Benson-have described two types termed 'pseudodepressive' and 'pseudopsychopathic'. The former exhibit outward apathy, little overt emotion, interest, or verbal output, and have loss of initiative and sexual drive. The latter show lack of tact, verbally, socially and sexually, and appear immature with signs of hyperactivity and emotional incontinence.
These deficits in sexual and social behaviour can be interpreted as a reflecting an inability to use contextual cues and feedback to regulate behaviour. This commonly observed trait of frontal lobe patients is observed in other spheres and is well exemplified by that doyen of frontal lobe tasks, the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test. Frontal patients are quite efficient in learning the initial matching rule, but have great difficulty in making the necessary shifts of strategy when the rule is changed, even though, intriguingly, they often verbalize the correct solution. The errors tend to be perseverative, reflecting an inability to shift from previously correct strategies.
The role of the frontal lobes in tasks involving working memory has been particularly controversial. However, several experiments looking at different aspects of memory have highlighted double dissociations between frontal lobe patients and those with damage to the temporal lobes, the area traditionally associated with memory deficits. Corsi" has shown that frontal patients were unimpaired on simple recognition tasks. However, they were considerably more troubled, compared to control subjects, when asked to discriminate recency, a task which necessitated some manipulation of internalized knowledge. The opposite pattern of results was found in temporal lobe patients.
Comprehensive formulations and theories of frontal lobe function based on human data are necessarily compromised by the uncontrollability of natural lesions and the existence of previous pathology in surgical cases. Therefore, despite the presumed relative inequality of infrahuman prefrontal cortex, discrete lesions and accurate behavioural monitoring have provided invaluable further insight into its normal role.
The notion that frontal patients have abnormal control of behaviour is amply supported by animal lesion work. Impaired response inhibition and inflexibility, akin to deficits in card-sorting tests, are seen on a variety of standard learning tasks using reversal and extinction manipulanda. Orbitofrontal cortical lesions are seen to be particularly effective at producing perseverative patterns of behaviour towards, for example, previously rewarded responses.
A theory that dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is necessary for the manipulation of internalized knowledge has emerged from the work of Goldman-Rakic", Using a delayed matching to position eye movement task, she has described delay-dependent 'mnemonic scotoma' produced by unilateral small lesions of the sulcus principalis region, whether aspirative or, notably, dopaminergic. From this and other observations, such as finding deficits on successive but not simultaneous discriminations, Goldman-Rakic concludes that the prefrontal cortex elicits responses guided by internalized knowledge. This includes concepts and plans held in representational memory. The lesioned monkey becomes a 'creature of the moment' especially reliant on external cues. This explains the distractibility, hyperactivity, and the inability to inhibit previously correct responses in the light of new information. It is proposed that the alternative constellation of deficits after orbitofrontallesions reflects the animal's inability to access representations of autonomic, limbic and emotional information.
From this, a perspective offrontallobe functioning is viewed in terms of diversity and continuity. The unity is reflected in the general concept of executive guidance and control. The diversity may relate to focal localization of different aspects of this function within the frontal lobes.
Frontal lobe function in schizophrenia and Parkinson's disease
Conceptualizing schizophrenia as a disorder of the frontal lobes has a history dating right back to the earliest descriptions ofthe disease by Kraepelin and Bleuler at the turn of the century. Both considered hallucinations and bizarre delusions as accessory features, the fundamental problem being one of 'weakening of volition' or disruption of mental processes involved in co-ordinating thought and affect.
Similarly, both were aware of Alzheimer's claim that cell loss in layers two and three of frontal cortex represented pathognomonic pathology in the schizophrenic brain. In the fifties, one of the major rationales for frontal leucotomy was to isolate an abnormal 'schizophrenic' frontal lobe. Subsequent advances in neurochemistry and therapeutics, however, have focused attention more on limbic and subcortical dysfunction in schizophrenia. Only in recent years has interest been reawakened to the possibility that frontal lobe dysfunction may represent a fundamental deficit, even if mediated through limbic and subcortical systems.
Any attempts to construct a unified neuropsychology of schizophrenia are fraught with difficulties. Not least of these is its dichotomous nature. Early in its course, schizophrenia is classically a disorder of experience. Hallucinations, thought insertion, delusions, ideas of reference all correspond to a picture of acute, 'positive' symptom or, using Crow's terminology, type I schizophrenia that is amenable to neuroleptic medication. Later, type II generally emerges, a spectrum of dysfunction recalcitrant to standard therapy and characterized by the absence of normal processing, resulting in 'negative' or deficit symptomology. At this stage, abnormality is more observable and the disorder becomes more one of signs than symptoms. The two types, however, are by no means mutually exclusive and can occur concurrently, placing a heavy burden on any unified hypothesis of neural dysfunction.
The chronicity and nature of type II disease strongly imply underactivity of brain function. It will be argued that prefrontal neural damage most closely corresponds to this pattern. However, empirically, the so-called 'positive' symptoms are equally strongly suggestive of overactivity. In support of this, acute schizophrenics have a raised critical flicker fusion threshold", in common with controls that have been aroused either by concurrent mental tasks or by amphetamine. It is noteworthy that lowered critical flicker fusion thresholds appear to correlate well with hypofrontality. Acute patients are also hypersensitive to novel or intense stimuli; are found to habituate slowly, a feature supported by evoked potential evidence; and are unable to use a repeated warning signal, or 'prepulse', to offset a startle response", Studies of cerebral blood flow and glucose utilization that have specifically selected acute schizophrenics further support a notion of hyperactivity. It is also perhaps relevant that paroxysmal uncontrolled brain activity, as produced by left temporal lobe epilepsy, can mimic certain aspects of psychotic behaviour.
The source of this putative hyperactivity in schizophrenia has generated many speculations. It has been fashionable to assume that increased subcortical arousal produces the characteristic attentional deficits and disruption of thought processes as a secondary effect. However, it is proposed here that aberrant cortical activity is a primary event, consequent to 'hyper-connectivity' in the respective cortical regions. This may result from faulty neural development. Evidence for this is particularly strong in the grey matter of the anterior cingulate cortex 7 , a major outflow area for prefrontal cortex and a major source of input to ventral striatum. Unusually organized neuronal groupings are seen along with a significantly higher number of vertical axonal connections in laminae two and three, tentatively identified as originating from association cortex.
The speculation that the positive symptoms of schizophrenia might result from a dysplastic process has intuitive appeal when considering the genetics of the disease and the development of normal prefrontal cortex. Although the notion that faulty genes are a major aetiological factor in schizophrenia is generally accepted, their function and mode of transmission remain obscure. Given that synaptic density in prefrontal cortex peaks over the first year of life before steadily declining to stable adult levels over the next 16 years, a plausible hypothesis can be made to explain the development of acute schizophrenia.lffor largely genetic reasons, a schizophrenic's prefrontal cortex develops and matures abnormally, it might lead to over-connectivity and hyperactivity. It is reasonable to assume that structures taking longer to develop over the course of ontogeny therefore have a longer duration at risk. The resultant aberrant processing, the putative cause of schizophrenic attentional and thought disorders, might not be fully appreciated before the age at which the normal cortex is fully mature. The intriguing neuropathological observations that suggest schizophrenia is predominantly a left hemispheric disorder further back the notion of abnormal brain development.
On the question of frontal lobe dysfunction in type II schizophrenics, it is a truism that these provide a large reservoir of subjects from whom the notion that cognitive impairment reflects prefrontal damage is more easily contested. Unsystematic observation of such patients reveals their inability to form rapports with others. There prevails a sense that they have a strong focus on the irrelevant, that they are dominated by immediate stimuli in their environment. Behaviour breaks down when they are required to use internalized symbolic or verbal representations. Perseveration of action and poverty ofboth speech and goal-directed behaviour add to the picture, strongly reminiscent of frontal type deficits. Formal testing has helped to confirm this intuitive correlative observation.
Chronic schizophrenics are impaired on all standard tests of right and left frontal lobe function as well as many probing temporal lobe functions, Notable deficits have been documented on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, the Gotman-Milner Design Fluency Test, and copying of complex facial movements. The disruption of the ordered control of smooth-pursuit eye movements by saccadic intrusions and pursuit breakdown also invokes the notion offrontal pathology.
Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine Volume 84 June 1991 351 Physiological brain imaging techniques provide direct evidence for prefrontal dysfunction. Ingvar and Franzen" were the first to demonstrate that regional cerebral blood flow was reduced in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex of schizophrenics during 'resting' and various conditions of cortical activation. Numerous further studies have confirmed correlations between the degree of prefrontal inactivation in schizophrenics and the extent of their clinical deficits on tasks known, from controlled observations, to increase prefrontal blood flow. Investigation of glucose metabolism using positron emission tomography has also revealed prefrontal hypometabolism in studies where the subjects perform simple attentional tasks.
Extensively studied structural changes in the schizophrenic brain have provided conflicting evidence for prefrontal hypofunction. Most recent studies have highlighted the cellular degeneration apparent in limbic areas such as parahippocampal gyrus, entorhinal cortex, hippocampus, and amygdala, particularly in the left hemisphere-". Given that gross cell loss does occur in late-stage schizophrenia, an intriguing mechanism to explain it has been proposed by Miller!'. If it is accepted that positivesymptom schizophrenia reflects cortical overactivity, perhaps due to dysplastic 'over-connectivity', then it is conceivable that prolonged activation will elicit cell death via a mechanism of excitotoxicity. It is well established that naturally occurring excitatory amino acids, such as glutamate and aspartate, can destroy neurons after prolonged endogenous release. Indeed, this process probably occurs during normal cortical maturation. Such mechanisms of cell death would be expected to occur in areas that receive massive convergence of impulse activity, such as the hippocampus. In chronic schizophrenics, then, cell loss may reflect damage in predominantly left-sided limbic areas of the brain that have, in a colloquial sense, 'burnt themselves out', as a result of converging overactivity from higher cortical centres. The frontal flavour of the behavioural deficits might reflect the fact that some of the major output pathways of prefrontal cortex to limbic cortex have become severely compromised.
Turning attention to Parkinson's disease, the idea that the basal ganglia are involved in some aspect of 'higher' motor control is far from new. However, the observation that subtle deficits in cognition result from their dysfunction is a more recent topic of study, as witnessed by the exponential increase of relevant publications over the last two decades. The notion has arisen that the motor and 'thinking' difficulties in Parkinson's disease reflect a similar disability of the dopamine-depleted basal ganglia to deal with motor programmes and 'thoughts', respectively. Largely empirical descriptive studies of cognitive impairment in Parkinson's disease have been replaced by theorydriven attempts to elucidate the fundamental role subserved by the basal ganglia and their cortical connections.
It has become apparent that the most striking cognitive deficits are uncovered when the patient has to self-generate a response using 'internal' control of attention, the necessary current sensory information being unavailable. This is well demonstrated by the findings of Bloxham'S who has demonstrated a discrepancy between simple and choice reaction time deficits in parkinsonians. This was interpreted as showing that parkinsonians are unable to make good use of a detailed advance cue, another deficit arising from the inability to attend to and act on internalized knowledge.
Several studies have emphasized the poor performance of parkinsonians on the ubiquitous Wisconsin Card Sorting Test. Their deficits do not exactly mirror frontal lobe problems, however, since the errors include non-perseverative along with perseverative ones. It may be that the parkinsonian inflexibility reflects a strong resistance to switching back to a previously unrewarded strategy. In common with some frontal lobe patients, however, parkinsonians often verbalize correct responses but actually choose inappropriately.
There are several good neurobiological reasons why parkinsonians could be affected on tests of frontal lobe function. A current theme running through theories offronto-striatal interactions emphasizes the maintenance of discrete, partially closed 'loops' connecting cortex, striatum, pallidum, thalamus and, finally, cortex. This analysis leads to the conclusion that damage or disruption anywhere along each loop will produce a similar spectrum of behavioural deficits. At least five segregated circuits have been described':', based on different frontal cortical regions projecting to discrete areas of striatum and eventually back to homologous cortex. Prefrontal cortex functioning may be further compromised in Parkinson's disease since its direct dopamine input arising largely, but not exclusively, from the ventral tegmental area, degenerates significantly. In addition, post-mortem neurochemistry has revealed loss of the other ascending reticular inputs from midbrain and basal forebrain, significantly depleting the prefrontal cortex of noradrenaline, serotonin, and acetylcholine. Whether all these indices of damage to the prefrontal cortex summate to produce impairments on tasks sensitive to its function remains entirely speculative.
Psychological aspects of the control of action Now that the frontal nature of cognitive impairments in schizophrenia and Parkinson's disease has been addressed, it is possible to start to integrate this observation into more psychologically flavoured or 'black-box' theories of the executive control of action and its breakdown in disease.
Frith's influential position regarding schizophrenia has shown a marked change over recent years. Previously, he took the view that abnormal perception of internal and external stimuli, as a result of a defective 'Broadbentian' filter, accounted for the majority of experiential positive symptoms. However, from consideration of bizarre phenomena such as thought insertion and feelings of passivity, Frith has now moved to the view that aspects of 'output' and deficits in control of action represent the basic problem!". In the new scheme, faulty internal labelling of actions (including thoughts as 'internalised' actions) leads to misperceptions and delusions. Hallucinations are the subject's 'internal voice' but the source is believed to be external, even if the subject recognizes the vocal form as his own. Thought insertion similarly arises if the subject fails to recognize thoughts as being self-generated. Frith argues that all actions, overt and covert, are goaldirected and preceded by an intention that can either be stimulus elicited (a form offeedback), or else willed, that is, internal or anticipatory. This maps on to other theories, including those of Goldberg'" and of MacK ay16, proposing two routes to action. Goldberg, in particular, outlines a lateral premotor system, operational when action is generated in a mode 'responsive' to external information. This contrasts with a more developed and potentially dominant medial system that allows prospective control of action, endowing it with a feeling of volitional control. This is the putative system at fault in schizophrenics who, according to Frith, are unable to perceive actions as a consequence of their own will.
Frith envisages the negative, more obviously 'frontal' deficits of schizophrenia to reflect a failure of willed intentions to be translated into action. Stimulus intentions, however, can still control action, producing a patient lacking in spontaneity and dominated by immediate stimuli. In Parkinson's disease, stimulus intention driven actions are also predominant and willed intention ones disrupted because the executive control, from frontal cortex, fails to engage striatal schemata above threshold. This results from the absence of ascending dopaminergic activating or motivating influences. Thus, frontal lobe patients and chronic schizophrenics have similar observable deficits to parkinsonians as a result ofthe disruption of opposite ends of the fronto-striatal interaction, a conclusion alluded to earlier from a purely neuroanatomical perspective. Put simplistically, parkinsonians have the will to act but cannot translate it into action, whereas chronic schizophrenics lack the initial volitional process. The lack of emotionality in the two patient groups can be explained along similar lines.
The role of dopamine A position has now been reached where the role of dopamine and antidopaminergic therapy in schizophrenia can be addressed. The two pillars upon which the dopaminergic theory of schizophrenia has been based relate to the phenomenon of amphetamineinduced psychosis and the specific efficacy of dopaminergic (D2) antagonists as a treatment. Although hyperdopaminergic theories of schizophrenia have been well rehearsed, concrete neurochemical evidence has been discouragingly elusive. Proponents of the notion of increased dopamine activity, whether subcortical or cortical, as a primary cause of acute schizophrenia are a dwindling force. This is partly because the two 'pillars' referred to earlier are not particularly solid. Firstly, amphetamine psychosis mimics only certain aspects of schizophrenia such as paranoid delusions and attentional disorders. The more bizarre experiences of thought insertion, thought broadcasting, and passivity that are so peculiarly schizophrenic are rarely seen. Secondly, although neuroleptics have revolutionized therapeutic approaches to schizophrenia, they are generally ineffective in chronic schizophrenia, as mentioned previously, and are far from 'curative' even in responsive acute patients. For example, patients typically report that auditory hallucinations are 'quietened to a mumble' or that thought insertions and paranoid delusions still occur but are 'less bothersome', implying that a primary disturbance is still present, merely modified by the drugs.
However, one insightful aspect of amphetamine's effects on behaviour concerns the concept of stereotypy. An animal will show various levels of inflexible behaviour, depending on the dose administered. At high dosage, invariant repetition of purposeless sequences of behaviour is witnessed, known to depend on dopamine activation in the dorsal striatum. Lower doses lead to hyperactivity and perseverative goaldirected responding. This form of activation is more dependent on dopaminergic mechanisms in the ventral striatum. Notably, schizophrenics show marked stereotypies in all spheres of movement, thoughts, and desires, an empirical observation emphasized by Bleuler-? and further demonstrated on complex attentional tasks by contemporary researchers.
Stereotypy can be regarded as reflecting the dominance of behavioural patterns guided by stimulus intentions. With respect to schizophrenia, this has already been alluded to in the context of weakened willed intentions. In the case of amphetamine or some forms of stress, excessive dopaminergic stimulation in the striatum can be seen as indiscriminately activating schemata, rendering supervisory control and monitoring of willed intentions inefficient. Observable behaviour is consequently over-regulated by stimulus intentions. With low doses of amphetamine, the controlling stimuli are particularly those previously associated with reward. Under high doses, the putative eliciting stimuli seem to be less obviously external and may include proprioceptive input, for example. It is of relevance that behavioural work with animals has often highlighted the concordance between amphetamine-treated animals and those with frontal lesions'". It may seem a paradox that parkinsonians are also deemed to be relatively dependent on external stimuli in order to effect action. However, in this circumstance, intact willed intentions fail to activate schemata for the opposite reasons of dopamine deficiency as mooted earlier.
The mechanism of the beneficial effects of neuroleptics in acute schizophrenia can now be inferred. If Frith's scheme is followed, alleviation of experiential symptoms will be achieved either by increasing the awareness of excessive, unmonitored willed intentions or by non-specifically reducing their occurrence. Neuroleptics would act via this latter means, inducing parkinsonism at a cognitive level by blocking striatal dopamine receptors that may be relatively upregulated.
Conclusion
In summary, the above account has attempted to integrate the observed commonalities between (chronic) schizophrenia, Parkinson's disease, and prefrontal lesions with contemporary themes in neurobiology and psychology. The importance of dynamic fronto-striatal interactions has been stressed in the context of brain circuitry and its functional breakdown. That subcortical disruption can compromise functions attributed to normal and abnormal cortical processes emphasizes the concept of a 'vertical' disconnection syndrome, analogous to the 'horizontal' cortico-cortico disconnections beloved of classical behavioural neurology. Different patterns of disrupted fronto-striatal circuitry are proposed to result in the respective neurological and psychiatrical flavours of parkinsonism and schizophrenia. By corollary, this highlights the functional heterogeneity of striatal sub-regions.
Most attention has been focused on schizophrenia. The relatively new concept of endogenous excitatory neural damage, which may playa key role in normal brain maturation, has been invoked to explain the uneven progression of schizophrenic symptomology and neuropathology. Needless to say, unanswered Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine Volume 84 June 1991 353 riddles abound. Notable unaddressed conundra include the potential pathophysiological role of abnormal mesocortical dopamine action and the tantalizing evidence concerning the asymmetrical left-sided dominance of pathology in schizophrenia. However, it is firmly believed that, with an eclectic approach that integrates disparate areas of brain research, substantial progress can be made towards the goal of understanding this traditionally functional disorder in 'organic' terms.
